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A Structural Fit between States and Markets?  
Public Administration Regulation and Market Economy Models  
in the OECD 
ABSTRACT 
This article examines the relationship between public administration regulation and 
market economy models in 20 OECD countries. Building on Pollitt and Bouckaert’s 
(2004) administrative dimension, we employ explorative statistical analysis to identify 
three distinct public administration regimes: an Anglo-American, a French/German and 
a Scandinavian regime. The regime structure, especially with regard to public employ-
ment regulation, shows a high degree of institutional coherence with the co-ordination 
rules applying to the market economy. Probing deeper, we construct an index of poli-
tico-administrative regulation, which is compared to Hall and Gingerich’s (2009) index 
of market coordination. The empirical evidence leads us to presume that public admini-
stration reforms are likely to focus on the existing market economy model when intro-
ducing private sector instruments to public administrations. 
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A Structural Fit between States and Markets?  
Public Administration Regulation and Market Economy Models  
in the OECD 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A well-functioning public administration tends to be seen as a major achievement in the 
development of modern statehood and as a core resource of governments today. With 
the onset of privatizing public services and public sector modernization in the last two 
decades, public administrations have been subject to substantial changes. Inspired by 
the ideas of New Public Management (NPM), various OECD countries implemented 
quasi-market steering instruments (e.g., zero-based budgeting, performance related pay 
and/or accounting) aimed at improving the cost-efficiency of public service provision 
(Lane 2005, Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004, Lippert 2005). Fostered and monitored by in-
ternational organizations such as the OECD and the World Bank, this type of public 
sector modernization appears to be the new uniform global reform agenda, calling for an 
efficient use of public resources in times of growing economic competition and fiscal 
constraints (OECD 2004). 
From a comparative perspective, however, public administrations still vary substan-
tially across countries, e.g., “civil servants” in Anglo-American countries differ from 
“fonctionnaires” in France or “Beamte” in Germany (Wise 1996, van der Meer et al. 
2007). In general, Anglo-American countries such as Great Britain and the United 
States tend to be relatively proactive towards NPM ideas, whereas continental European 
states are seen as more reluctant (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004). Thus, countries continue 
to show different patterns of utilizing and implementing market-like steering instru-
ments in their national public administration, despite relatively similar reform goals. 
These differences appear to be rather persistent, as countries differ not only with respect 
to their reform effort, but also with respect to the selection of instruments (Pollitt and 
Bouckaert 2004).  
Against this background, two questions are at the center of this study: First, are there 
distinct administrative regimes within the OECD? Second, how do these regimes relate 
to the predominant rules of private sector market co-ordination? Whereas various stud-
ies suggest that country-specific factors play an important role in the implementation of 
NPM (Blanke et al. 2005; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004), there has been little effort to 
systematize and characterize these differences. Our first question seeks to address this 
issue by assuming that not only single features, such as public sector employment, but 
the overall public sector formation might differ across countries. Meanwhile, our second 
question refers to the ability of countries to pick and choose from the NPM reform 
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menu. To this end, we draw on the “Varieties of Capitalism” (VoC) literature and its 
focus on institutional coherence between economic and societal domains. Building on 
prior research by Albert (1992), Hall and Soskice’s (2001) comparative analysis of 
market economies in times of globalization suggests that instead of institutional conver-
gence, two modes of successful market co-ordination continue to coexist. With the on-
set of NPM, private sector co-ordination mechanisms have become the role model for 
public sector co-ordination. In the context of public sector modernization, the VoC’s 
focus on institutional coherence implies that countries choose NPM reform instruments 
that are institutionally coherent with their market economy model. If this is the case we 
expect to observe a certain degree of institutional congruence or ‘tandem-like’ fit of 
regulatory institutions in the public and private sector.  
This study is organized as follows: The next section sets out the theoretical frame-
work, embedding public administration regimes within market economy models. Build-
ing on the work of Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004: Ch.3), section three presents the ana-
lytical dimensions for the classification of public administration regimes and our trans-
lation of these dimensions into empirical indicators. Section four explains our method-
ology. The fifth section presents results from the Multiple Correspondence Analysis 
(MCA) and the Principal Component (PC) factor analysis. Finally, we discuss the bene-
fits and limitations of our results and indicate implications for further research. 
2. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REGIMES AND VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM 
Current public administration reforms in OECD countries are inspired by the idea of 
efficiency maximization through market or market-like mechanisms (Horton and Farn-
ham 2000; Reichard 2005; Demmke 2006, Lane 2005). Achieving cost-efficient public 
sector production represents a core intention of the NPM paradigm (König 1997; Na-
schold and Bogumil 2000). This re-orientation towards market principles appears to 
change the relationship between the state and the market. Whereas in previous times the 
state’s role in the expansion of markets has been to provide the norms and laws for 
market interaction (North 1990), currently the state seems to actively copy market 
mechanisms. This perceived public sector reform, however, has not apply to every 
country to the same extent. Empirical evaluations of public administration reforms 
(OECD 2005b) show that intensity, scope and timing of reforms vary substantially 
across countries. 
Prior research on public administration modernization tends to concentrate on the 
implementation of certain instruments (accounting, performance-related pay, standard 
cost models, budgeting, etc.) and pays little attention to variation in contextual factors. 
The analytical focus is on the implementation of a specific reform measure, rather than 
exploring the conditions that shape its implementation (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973). 
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More recent studies show that there are persistent country differences in NPM imple-
mentation practices (Auer et al. 1996, Schröter and Wollmann 1997, Manning and Pari-
son 2004, Pollitt 2003). Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004: 39) conclude that country-specific 
contextual factors play an important role in the success of public management reforms, 
although this does not imply that any reform proposal has to fully adapt to the institu-
tional circumstances in order to be successful. Thus, despite the popularity of the NPM 
reform terminology, case studies on public sector reform do not indicate the dominance 
of a single coherent reform strategy (Auer et al. 1996, Hood 2003, Manning and Parison 
2004, Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004). Instead this research suggests that reform efforts 
vary substantially across countries. The puzzling question is how to make sense of 
cross-country differences in public administration reform? 
With the end of the Cold War and the rise of international trade, comparative politi-
cal economists have shifted their attention toward differences in the configuration of 
market economies (Amable 2004, Schmidt 2002. Crouch and Streeck 1997). The “Va-
rieties of Capitalism” (VoC) approach asserts that in spite of increasing demand for 
convergence caused by global economic integration, different market economy models 
continue to coexist. These market models may be equally successful, but they differ 
considerably in how they resolve co-ordination problems. Hall and Soskice’s (2001) 
comparative analysis of market economies places firms at the center of their considera-
tion. Private sector firms operate at many different levels and, therefore, are confronted 
with numerous co-ordination problems. Two of the most vital co-ordination problems a 
firm is confronted with are wage bargaining with employees and/or employees’ collec-
tive interest organization on the one hand, and balancing conflicting investors’ interests 
on the other. Whereas the co-ordination problems are virtually the same across all mar-
ket economies, Hall and Soskice (2001) argue that market economies can be distin-
guished by considering which institutions they chose to solve different co-ordination 
problems. By comparing market economies across countries, they identify two ideal 
modes of market co-ordination: liberal market economies (LMEs) and coordinated mar-
ket economies (CMEs). In LMEs firms co-ordinate with other actors primarily through 
competitive markets, while CMEs limit or partially replace the market mechanism with 
compulsory collective co-ordination rules. This distiniction becomes evident in a num-
ber of distinct ways: in the degree of a firm’s market capitalization, the relative power 
of shareholders and the extent and coverage of employment protection (Hall and Gin-
gerich 2009). Placing these two ideal modes of co-ordination at the extremes of a scale, 
the VoC approach provides a ranking of market economies ranging from liberal econo-
mies (e.g., the USA) to highly coordinated economies (e.g., Germany). Alternative 
cross-country classification, such as Esping-Andersen’s (1990) worlds of welfare capi-
talism or Castles (1993) work on families of nations, suggest at least three clusters of 
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countries: a market liberal Anglo-American, a conservative Continental-European and a 
service-state-oriented Scandinavian cluster. In this light, it remains an empirical ques-
tion whether the CME/LME continuum adequately captures variation between regimes. 
The theoretical contribution of the VoC approach lies in how it shifts the analytical 
perspective from a single policy or reform measure towards the institutional framework 
in which this policy takes place. The two theoretical concepts central to the VoC de-
scription of different market production regimes are the concept of institutional coher-
ence and institutional complementarity (Höpner 2005, Crouch et al. 2005, Aoki 1994). 
Hall and Soskice (2001) assume that, due to institutional complementarity, coordinating 
institutions within LMEs and CMEs countries are mutually stabilizing. Accodring to 
Höpner (2005: 333), institutional complementarity means “that the performance of a 
configuration increases when its elements assume specific properties”, whereas institu-
tional coherence implies that “institutions are designed according to identical princi-
ples”. National market economies are not seen as a random set of independent institu-
tions, but as a specific configuration where the different domains of the economy – in-
dustrial relations, finance, corporate governance, training and social protection – create 
a particular rationality of economic action (Deeg and Jackson 2007: 152). Focusing on 
the interaction between these domains has methodological implications. While quantita-
tive oriented studies primarily investigate institutional coherence on the basis of cross-
national comparisons (Hall and Gingerich 2009, Kenworthy 2006, Hicks and Kenwor-
thy 2003), researchers aiming to identify institutional complementarity primarily rely on 
in-depth case-study research approaches to describe the feedback-processes behind in-
stitutional congruence (Streeck and Thelen 2005, Thelen 2004). Strictly speaking, there 
is no reason to assume that complementarity can be derived from institutional congru-
ence and vice versa. Thus, following Höpner (2005: 334), we will consider the cluster-
ing of certain countries and their co-ordination institutions as an indication of coher-
ence, but not as a proof of complementarity. 
Why might the VoC approach help one to understand systematic differences in pub-
lic administration regulation? The institutional coherence argument suggests that co-
ordination rules in different economical and societal domains are following compatible 
principles. Applying this argument to national public administration systems implies 
that there should be a ‘tandem-like’ fit, or congruence, between the co-ordination rules 
in the public and private domain. In analogy to the firm, which has to co-ordinate with 
employees on the one side and investors on the other, the state can also be considered as 
being confronted with a two-sided co-ordination problem. In its role as an employer, the 
state has to co-ordinate its relationship with public employees. In its role as an executive 
instrument of the government, the state has to co-ordinate its relationship with politics. 
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Given this, we focus on rules applying to the co-ordination of public employment and 
the politico-administrative realm. 
Taking a more dynamic perspective, Höpner (2005: 333) suggests that complemen-
tarities may reinforce resistance to change, if we can assume certain overlaps between 
complementarity and institutional stability. Applying this idea to public administration 
modernization would even imply that the selection and implementation of NPM instru-
ments takes place on the basis of the existing market model, and not on the basis of a 
uniform global NPM-reform agenda. For the purpose of this study, we will begin with 
the exploration of the institutional coherence argument by taking a static analytical 
view. We need to understand the structural differences between administrative regimes, 
before we can embark into a study of administration reforms. According to these con-
siderations, we searched for patterns of institutional coherence between the regulation of 
the market economy and the regulation of the public administration. 
3. DIMENSIONS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REGIMES 
Before we can compare public administration models with the market economy model, 
we need to define a reasonable framework to describe the properties of different public 
administration systems. The contemporary comparative public administration literature 
tends to be grounded in a rich set of case studies, because the efforts to assess public 
administration policies in a larger number of countries are still at an early stage. One of 
the first difficulties in classifying public administrations from a cross-country perspec-
tive is to determine the dimensions for comparison. According to Peters (1996), four 
elements – structures, behaviour, power and human resources – constitute the main in-
terests of comparative public management research. Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004) pro-
vide a refinement of these dimensions by focusing on constitutional, functional and cul-
tural elements of public administration systems. Their framework is based on five di-
mensions that are assumed to constitute the terrain for public administration reforms: 
(1) state structure, (2) executive government, (3) minister/mandarin relations, (4) ad-
ministrative culture and (5) diversity of policy advice. In providing a comprehensive 
analytical framework for the study of public sector modernization, we will use Pollitt 
and Bouckaert’s (2004) framework to classify public administration regimes.  
A second difficulty in comparative public administration research arises from the 
availability of comparative cross-national data. Whereas for decades comparative soci-
ologists and political scientists have been occupied with the exploration of public ex-
penditure data (Clasen and Siegel 2007), there is still little comparative information 
available on many other aspects: e.g., the size of public employment – which can be 
considered as a core resource of the state additional to public expenditures– or the or-
ganizational features of public administrations. Given the lack of comparative data, 
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there is no generally accepted classification of public administration regimes, even 
though different approaches habe been discussed in the literature (e.g., by Hood 2003). 
By taking advantage of recent progress in collecting comparative data on public admini-
stration policies in OECD nations, we will try to animate the Pollitt and Bouckaert 
(2004) framework within an explorative research design. To begin with, the following 
paragraphs review the five dimensions suggested by Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004) and 
present our operationalization of these dimensions into a full set of comparative indica-
tors. 
(1) State structure: This dimension aims to capture the most relevant constitutional 
differences among countries. Referring to the division of state authority on different 
levels of government, it measures the horizontal separation of governmental powers. 
Unlike public administration in unitary states, public administration in federal systems 
is characterized by the delegation of state competences to autonomous or semi-
autonomous local authorities. At least two aspects of decentralized state authority can 
be relevant for public administration reform. On the one hand, member states in a fed-
eral system can be used as ‘natural laboratories’, in which single NPM instruments are 
tested before being transferred to the central state level or to other member states. On 
the other hand, fundamental public management reforms have been primarily realized in 
centralized states (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004: 44), indicating that centralized compe-
tencies may allow for more rigorous reforms. Furthermore, there are potential econo-
mies of scale advantages in a centralized unitary state. Huber and Shipan (2002) exam-
ine the structural conditions, which lead to more or less discretionary bureaucracy. 
Comparing various countries, they find a positive relationship between the density of 
administrative regulations and a federal state structure. Following Pollitt and Bouckaert 
(2004), the state structure is measured with Lijphart’s (1999) state structure index, 
which differentiates between federal and centralistic states. 
(2) Executive government: The second dimension refers to the political decision-
making process. Comparative political sciences distinguishes between two basic types 
of democratic systems: majoritarian and consensual democracies. Majoritarian democ-
racies are characterized by one-party governments, executive dominance over the legis-
lature, a two-party system with majority voting and a pluralistic representation of inter-
ests. Consensual democracies, by contrast, tend to have multiple party coalitions, a rela-
tive balance between the executive and legislature, a proportional electoral system and a 
corporatist representation of interests. These differences in the political decision-making 
process are likely to generate different types of policy reforms. When they consider 
public management modernization, Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004) note that majoritarian 
democracies such as Australia, Canada, New-Zealand and Great Britain have imple-
mented more extensive public management reforms than comparable governments in 
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consensual democracies. Following Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004) suggestion, executive 
government structure is captured by means of Lijphart’s (1999) executive government 
index, which distinguishes between consensual and majoritarian democracies. 
(3) Minister/mandarin relations: The third dimension primarily analyzes the charac-
teristics of the political-administrative system. This dimension concerns the influence of 
top-ranking officials on political decisions, and the relationship between the bureauc-
racy and the government in general. The collaboration between political and administra-
tive executives might be a factor in public management reform. To what extent “deals” 
between the two groups of elites can be negotiated depends in particular on the adminis-
trative executives and whether they are political or apolitical. A formal politization is 
more likely if bureaucrats are directly appointed by political actors (Schnapp 2004). The 
NPM concept calls for a basic reformulation of the relationship between politics and 
public administration, by  demanding a strict separation between the political and ad-
ministrative sphere. We try to capture cross-national variance in minister/mandarin rela-
tions with four alternative measures. Two items are taken from the Sustainable Govern-
ance Indicators (SGI 2009) project.1 The variable bureaucratic drift is based on the fol-
lowing question: “How effectively do ministries monitor the activities of executive 
agencies?” Concerning the role of the senior civil service the experts were asked “How 
effectively do senior ministry officials (leading civil servants) prepare cabinet meet-
ings?” As these two measures can only serve as proxy-indicators for Pollitt and 
Bouckaert’s minister/mandarin relations we employ two supplementary variables. One 
is the scope of public employment, which is measured as the share of public employees 
in the total working population. This variable is taken from the OECD (2000, 2002) 
Public Sector Pay and Employment Data (various issues) and the World Bank’s (2001) 
Cross-National Data on Government Employment and Wages. And finally, the variable 
senior civil service, which indicates whether the public management system allows for 
the presence of so-called ‘mandarins’: public servants in ministries and public agencies, 
operating at the top levels of management. This variable is also taken from the OECD 
(2003, 2007) Comparison of Employment in the Public Domain Survey (CEPD).2 
                                                 
1  The SGI data is based on expert interviews. In each OECD member state three leading scholars with established 
country expertise were asked to answer a combined standardized and non-standardized questionnaire. 
Additioanly, subjective assessments had to be substantiated with empirical evidence. A detailed explanation of 
the methodological concept is presented at www.sgi-network.org . Unfortunately, the SGI Project does not pro-
vide information on the variance between expert assessments. 
2  We are grateful towards the OECD’s Directorate for Public Governance and Territorial Development for provid-
ing us the Comparison of Employment in the Public Domain (CEPD) Data in an aggregated Excel file. 
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(4) Administrative culture: The fourth dimension aims to describe differences in ad-
ministrative culture. Individual level research on public sector work ethos suggests that 
public servants can be distinguished from private sector employees by their specific 
values and by the way services are provided, namely in a rather bureaucratic or output 
oriented fashion (Norris 2003, Houston 2000). Pierre (1995) and König (1997) suggest 
that the NPM approach might be more easily reconcilable with organizational attitude in 
the Anglo-American administration than with the German-French public management 
tradition. To this end, Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004) distinguish between public manage-
ment regimes with a ‘public interest’ orientation and those with a legalistic ‘constitu-
tional state’ orientation. Countries with a strong ‘constitutional’ orientation are pre-
sumed to be less flexible towards the NPM approach. Different cultures of public man-
agement are explored on the basis of three indicators. First, legal traditions can be as-
sumed to find an expression in the administrative culture. There are at least four legal 
traditions in the OECD world: Anglo-American, Continental European-French, Conti-
nental European-German and Scandinavian (La Porta et al. 1998).3 Second, Hofstede’s 
(1994) uncertainty avoidance index is used to proxy general risk-taking and behavior 
under uncertainty. Cultures intending to avoid uncertainty should be characterized by a 
higher degree of administrative regulation. Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004) refer to exactly 
this indicator in order to express differences in public administration cultures. However, 
one should bear in mind that Hofstede’s index was established on the basis of staff sur-
veys in private companies. The uncertainty avoidance index is therefore likely to be 
biased. Concerning the direction of the bias, we expect that the index underestimates the 
actual scope of risk aversion in public administration, as survey research has shown that 
public servants have a tendency to take fewer risks than employees in private companies 
(Norris 2003, Houston 2000). This bias would only matter to the extent to which it var-
ies between countries. Finally, we considered the use of performance related pay poli-
cies (OECD 2004, 2005a), since administrative systems that already make use of this 
NPM instrument should encounter less resistance to fully adopting the NPM reform 
agenda. 
(5) Diversity of policy advice: The last dimension of Pollitt and Bouckaert’s (2004) 
framework on public management reform refers to the diversity of the key sources of 
advice to ministers on public management reform issues. Theoretically, ministers might 
                                                 
3  The classification of legal traditions by La Porta et al. (1998) does not differentiate between public and private 
law. For a more detailed theoretical discussion on public law legal traditions see Grote (2001). Since there is no 
alternative classification of legal traditions available that covers our 20 OECD countries and since the La Porta et 
al. (1998) classification has been widely used in cross-national comparative research, we will also rely on this in-
dicator as a proxy measure for legal traditions.  
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take advice from their political party, mandarins, lobbyists or academia. Pollitt and 
Bouckaert (2004:57) assume that the wider the range of customary sources of advice, 
the more likely it is that new ideas from outside the public sector – such as NPM – will 
gain influence. Due to the limited availability of comparative data on this dimension we 
have to rely on a single indicator also taken from the SGI (2009). Country experts have 
been asked “How influential are non-governmental academic experts for government 
decision making?” Straightforwardly, we expect that administrative systems that are 
open towards expertise from outside the bureaucracy should also be more compatible 
with NPM ideas. 
Table 1: Operationalization of Pollitt and Bouckaert’s (2004) dimensions of public 
administration 
Dimension  
Pollitt and Bouckaert 
Public employment  
regulation indicators 
Politico-administrative 
regulation indicators Source Scale 
State Structure   Federal-unitary  
dimension 
Lijphart (1999) (quasi) 
metric 
Executive  
Government 
  Executives-parties 
dimension 
Lijphart (1999) (quasi) 
metric 
  Public sector  
unions 
 OECD (2007) categorical  
  Public sector  
bargaining 
 OECD (2007) categorical  
Minister/ 
Mandarin Relation 
  Bureaucratic drift 
(How effectively do 
ministries monitor the 
activities of executive 
agencies?) 
SGI (2009) (quasi) 
metric 
   Role of senior civil 
service (How effec-
tively do senior minis-
try officials (leading 
civil servants) prepare 
cabinet meetings?) 
SGI (2009) (quasi) 
metric 
   Scope of public em-
ployment 
OECD (2000, 2002)  
World Bank (2001) 
(quasi) 
metric 
  Existence of senior 
civil service 
 OECD (2007) categorical  
Administrative  
culture 
  Uncertainty avoidance Hofstede (1994) (quasi) 
metric 
  Performance  
related pay 
 OECD (2007)  categorical  
  Legal tradition  La Porta et al. (1998) categorical  
Diversity of policy 
advice 
  Academic advice 
(How influential are 
non-governmental 
academic experts for 
government decision 
making?) 
SGI (2009) (quasi) 
metric 
 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 120) 
- 10 - 
Table 1 summarizes the dimensions of Pollitt and Bouckaert’s (2004) framework of 
politico-administrative regimes and our operationalization of this framework with com-
parative indicators. Although the selection of indicators and their affiliated dimensions 
is based on logic and supported by the literature, especially Pollitt and Bouckaert’s 
(2004) framework, we freely admit that the selection and affiliation of indicators is not 
beyond dispute. Due to the explorative character of this investigation and the fact that 
this framework has not been empirically examined in a larger number of countries, we 
believe that our broad collection of comparative public administration indicators should 
be able to illustrate structural differences between public administration regimes in the 
OECD world.4 
In order to explore the second question concerning the relationship between public 
administration regulation and the market economy model, we use Hall and Gingerich’s 
(2009) market co-ordination index.5 The index is based on factor scores from Principal 
Component (PC) factor analysis. Their analysis includes the following measures: share-
holder power, dispersion of control, size of the stock market, level of wage co-
ordination, degree of wage co-ordination and the labor turnover. The resulting index of 
market co-ordination expresses the distinction between liberal (LMEs) and coordinated 
market economies (CMEs), where higher scores represent higher co-ordination. 
4. METHOD 
In 1992, Derlien described the status of comparative public administration as “rather 
comparable than comparative”. Taking a qualitative approach, Pollitt and Bouckaert’s 
(2004: 42) classification of public administrations is already based on 12 countries. Due 
to advancements in comparative data collection by various institutions, we are able to 
cover 20 OECD countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portu-
gal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Great Britain and the United States of America). In 
order to investigate the existence of distinct public administration regimes and to test 
whether these regimes are institutionally coherent with the market economy model, we 
employ two explorative statistical methods. Depending on the scale level of the indica-
                                                 
4  Since the research design is explorative in nature we do not take into account alternative explanations (e.g., veto 
players, partisanship, unionism, etc.) of public management reform. Testing the explanatory power of the public-
administration-regime-classification against these alternative explanations will be left to further research. 
5  We thank Peter Hall and Daniel Gingerich for providing us the dataset they used in their 2009 article. The same 
indicator can also be found in an earlier working paper version from 2004: “Varieties of Capitalism and Institu-
tional Complementarities in the Macroeconomy: An Empirical Analysis”. Discussion Paper 04/5, Max-Planck-
Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung (page 14). 
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tor, we will either use Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) or Principal Compo-
nent (PC) factor analyses. 
MCA can be considered as a certain kind of multiple correlation analysis applicable 
for the analysis of large contingency tables (Clausen 1998, Blasius and Greenacre 
2006). The basic idea is to reduce a complex data matrix into a limited number of di-
mensions without loosing essential information. Hence, MCA makes it possible to rep-
resent the association between two or more categorical variables by representing the 
categories of the variables as points in a two or more dimensional space (Clausen 1998: 
2). Categories with similar distributions will be represented as points that are close to 
each other, while categories that are dissimilar in their distribution will be positioned far 
apart (Clausen 1998: 10). The resulting dimensions are evaluated on the basis of their 
contribution to capture total variance and, thus, it is up to the researcher to interpret the 
dimensions and the location of points in a theoretically sensible manner. If there are 
distinct public administration regimes among our 20 OECD nations, we expect to find 
certain clusters of points. For example, given prior evidence from comparative admini-
stration research, the point indicating Common Law should be located close to the point 
indicating the use of performance related pay policies. 
One very useful feature of MCA is the possibility of introducing a so-called passive 
or supplementary variable. The categories of the passive variable are points without 
mass, implying that they do not contribute to the explained variance within a given a 
dimension. However, since we are able to calculate the Chi-square distances for these 
passive points, they can be located in n-dimensional space (Clausen 1998: 21). We will 
use this feature to test whether the market economy model is coherent with public ad-
ministration regimes. Since MCA requires categorical variables, the Hall and Gingerich 
(2009) market coordination index has been transformed into tercentiles – low, medium, 
high. Compared to the original dichotomy, this allows us to test the VoC assumption 
that countries line up on a single dimension. If there is institutional coherence between 
the market economy model and the public administration regimes, the passive point 
indicating high market co-ordination should be located close to those points indicating a 
highly regulated public administration. 
As for the indicators capturing differences in the politico-administrative system, we 
follow the methodological approach taken by Hall and Gingerich (2009) and employ 
Principal Component (PC) factor analysis. Similar to MCA, PC is an explorative data 
reduction technique. Confronted with a large set of (quasi) metric variables, PC is used 
to discover which variables in the set form a coherent subset (Tabachnick and Fidell 
2001: Ch.13). The resulting factor is used to compute factor scores for each country in 
our sample. These factor scores will be standardized to a public administration regula-
tion index, which will then be plotted against Hall and Gingerich (2009) index of mar-
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ket co-ordination. In doing so, we will be able to examine whether a positive relation-
ship between public and private sector co-ordination actually exists. 
Table 2: Market economy coordination scores and public employment regulation 
Country 
Coordination 
scoresa 
Legal  
tradition 
Public sector 
bargaining 
Public sector 
unions 
Performance 
related pay 
Existence of 
senior civil 
service 
Austria high German two tiers collective strong no No 
Belgium high French single  collective strong no yes 
Germany high German single  collective moderate yes No 
Italy high French two tiers collective strong yes yes 
Japan high German no collective moderate yes No 
Norway high Scand. two tiers collective strong yes yes 
       
Denmark medium Scand. two tiers collective strong yes No 
Finland medium Scand. two tiers collective strong yes yes 
France medium French single  collective moderate yes yes 
Nether-
lands medium French 
two tiers 
collective moderate yes No 
Portugal medium French single  collective moderate no No 
Spain medium French single  collective weak yes No 
Sweden medium Scand. two tiers collective moderate no No 
       
Australia low Common single  collective weak yes yes 
Canada low Common single  collective moderate yes yes 
Ireland low Common no collective moderate yes no 
New 
Zealand low Common 
single  
collective moderate no yes 
Switzer-
land low German 
single  
collective weak yes no 
UK low Common no collective strong yes yes 
USA low Common no collective weak yes yes 
Note: a) Coordination scores taken from Hall and Gingerich (2009) 
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5. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
The empirical analysis will proceed in two steps.6 First, public employment regulation 
will be examined according to Pollitt and Bouckaert’s (2004) dimensions using MCA, 
while Hall and Gingerich’s (2009) market coordination index will be entered as a pas-
sive variable. Second, employing PC factor analysis, we will compute an index of poli-
tico-administrative regulation, which will then be plotted against Hall and Gingerich’s 
(2009) market coordination index. 
5.1. Public Employment Regulation and Market Coordination 
Table 2 summarizes our set of categorical variables used to describe public employment 
regulation. Countries have been ordered by the tercentiles, as found in Hall and Gin-
gerich’s (2009) market coordination index. A preliminary look at the table suggests that 
low market coordination is affiliated with a German/French legal tradition, whereas 
countries with a Common Law tradition tend to be in the group of countries with the 
highest co-ordination scores. An assessment of the affiliation between market co-
ordination and the other four indicators remains difficult from merely looking at the 
table. Thus, we turn to the MCA. Figure 1 shows the results of the MCA based on the 
variables from Table 1, entering the market co-ordination index as a passive variable. 
Jointly, both axes of the two-dimensional diagram account for 66.5 percent of total vari-
ance (47.5 percent plus 19.0 percent). The third dimension captures only additional 6.75 
percent of total variance and will therefore be considered as irrelevant for the substan-
tive interpretation (Clausen 1998: 24). 
We begin by focusing on the active variables. With regard to legal traditions, a clear 
distinction can be made between countries with a Common Law tradition and countries 
with a German/French or Scandinavian legal tradition. Points indicating the Ger-
man/French and Scandinavian legal tradition can be found on a hypothetical line to 
which the ‘Common Law’ systems are diametrically opposed. In this respect, the cate-
gories of the variable ‘legal tradition’ span a triangle in which the points of the other 
variables are located. For illustration purposes, the lines of this ‘hypothetical triangle’ 
have been added to the figure. In relative proximity to the feature “Common Law” are 
the points indicating “no pay bargaining”, “senior civil service”, “weak unions” and 
“performance pay”; while, in relative proximity to the feature “Scandinavian law” are 
the points indicating “two tiers collective bargaining”, and “strong public sector un-
ions”. The points indicating a German/French legal tradition lie relatively close to-
gether. These two legal traditions are affiliated with ‘moderate unions’, ‘single tier col-
                                                 
6  The statistical analysis is performed with Stata 10. The dataset and syntax are available for reproduction purposes 
(markus.tepe@uni-oldenburg.de). 
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Figure 1: Public employment regulation and market coordination  
(Multiple correspondence analysis) 
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lective bargaining’ and the absence of ‘performance pay’ policies. In sum, the MCA 
suggests three clusters of public administration regimes, where the strongest differences 
can be found between Common Law countries, on the one hand, and German/French 
law countries, on the other.  
We will now turn to the interpretation of the passive variable: the market co-
ordination score. According to the institutional coherence argument derived from the 
VoC literature, we suggested that the passive points indicating high, medium or low 
market co-ordination should lie close to the three public administration clusters. If there 
is a ‘tandem-like’ fit between the market economy model and the public administration 
regime, this should become visible in the localization of co-ordination points. Figure 1 
shows that the point indicating low market co-ordination lies in close proximity to the 
Common Law cluster, whereas the points indicating medium and high market co-
ordination are closely located to the French/German law cluster. The Scandinavian pub-
lic administration cluster seems not to fit with the market co-ordination classification.  
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In sum, the active variables describing public employment regulation vary on two 
dimensions, whereas the market co-ordination index varies only on one dimension be-
tween Common Law and French/German law tradition. Additionally, Scandinavian law 
countries are not adequately described by the CME/LME continuum. Based on these 
results, we suggest the following interpretation. The first dimension (x-axis) captures 
the concept of statehood with a service-oriented state in Scandinavian countries and a 
regulatory-oriented state in Common Law, French and German law countries. The sec-
ond dimension (y-axis) captures how regulatory-oriented states actually solve the co-
ordination problems – via market (Common Law) or via non-market mechanisms 
(French/German law).  
5.2. Politico-Administrative Regulation and Market Coordination 
Table 3 summarizes our metric and quasi-metric variables used to describe the politico-
administrative system. Once more, countries have been ordered according to Hall and 
Gingerich’s (2009) market co-ordination index. As above, the descriptive table does not 
allow us to easily identify any systematic relationship between market coordination and 
any of the seven indicators of public administration. As a first step, we  computed aver-
ages, according to the market co-ordination tercentiles. While it still remains difficult to 
establish a clear relationship between market co-ordination and public administration 
indicators, Table 3 suggests that countries with the lowest market co-ordination tend to 
have consensual governments, high uncertainty avoidance and low influence of aca-
demic advice when compared to countries with the highest market co-ordination. The 
assessment of countries with a medium level of market co-ordination appears to be the 
most difficult. If anything, these countries tend to have the highest average scope of 
public employment. Focusing on this indicator confirms that Scandinavian countries 
have an outstandingly high level of public employment. We suppose that this indicator 
is of particular relevance to describe service-orientated statehood, as our overall meas-
ure of public employment covers both public administration employees and overall pub-
lic sector employees. 
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Table 3: Market economy coordination scores and politico-administrative regulation 
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Austria 1.00 0.26 1.08 11.53 70 8.5 6.6 4 
Germany 0.95 0.23 2.53 10.85 65 10 8.9 4 
Italy 0.87 1.16 -0.11 13.2 75 4 6.6 5.5 
Norway 0.76 0.92 -0.65 28.67 50 10 10 8.5 
Belgium 0.74 1.42 0.21 16.87 94 7 8.9 4 
Japan 0.74 0.85 0.22 5.26 92 8.5 6.6 4 
mean 0.84 0.81 0.55 14.40 74.33 8.00 7.93 5.00 
         
Finland 0.72 1.66 -0.83 21.09 59 8.5 10 5.5 
Portugal 0.72 0.36 -0.7 13.38 104 7 5.5 5.5 
Denmark 0.70 1.45 -0.38 23.1 23 8.5 8.9 5.5 
France 0.69 -0.93 -0.17 21.76 86 7 8.9 2.5 
Sweden 0.69 1.04 -0.79 29.24 29 10 10 8.5 
Netherlands 0.66 1.16 0.35 12.86 53 7 10 10 
Spain 0.57 -0.59 0.42 12.22 86 7 8.9 4 
mean 0.68 0.59 -0.30 19.09 62.86 7.86 8.89 5.93 
         
Switzerland 0.51 1.87 1.61 7.11 58 4 5.5 5.5 
Australia 0.36 -0.67 1.72 13.59 51 8.5 7.8 4 
Ireland 0.29 0.12 -0.42 14.1 35 5.5 8.9 5.5 
New Zealand 0.21 -1.12 -1.77 11.8 49 10 7.8 7 
Canada 0.13 -1.07 1.88 16.47 48 8.5 8.9 8.5 
UK 0.07 -1.39 -1.19 18.1 35 7 8.9 7 
USA 0.00 -0.52 2.36 14.08 46 10 7.8 7 
mean 0.22 -0.40 0.60 13.61 46.00 7.64 7.94 6.36 
Note: a) ranges from majoritarian (low values) to consensual (high values), b) ranges from centralized (low values) to 
decentralized (high values), c) measured as a share of the working population d) ranges from 1 (low) to 120 (high) 
uncertainty avoidance, e) ranges from 1 (weak influence) to 10 (strong influence).  
 
To furthermore reduce the complexity of information provided in Table 3, we will now 
consider the results of the PC analysis. This analysis identifies an underlying factor with 
an eigenvalue of 2.8, whereas the second factor has an eigenvalue of 1.3. Given these 
differences, we use factor scores from the first factor to measure politico-administrative 
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regulation.7 In Figure 2 the standardized factor scores [0,1] are plotted against Hall and 
Gingerich’s (2009) market co-ordination index [0,1]. The scatterplot indicates three 
clusters of countries. Anglo-American countries tend to combine low market co-
ordination scores with medium politico-administrative regulation (USA, Canada, New 
Zealand, Ireland, UK). French/German countries tend to have high market co-ordination 
scores and high politico-administrative regulation scores (Japan, Portugal, Belgium, 
Spain, Switzerland, Italy, Austria). For these two groups we find a positive relationship 
between market co-ordination and politico-administrative regulation providing empiri-
cal support for the institutional coherence argument (see linear approximation in Figure 
2). Scandinavian countries, however, do not follow this pattern (Sweden, Norway, 
Denmark, Finland). These countries combine high market co-ordination with low poli-
tico-administrative regulation.  
Figure 2: Politico-administrative regulation and market co-ordination 
(Principal component analysis) 
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Note: The dashed line represents a linear approximation (without Scandinavian law countries). 
 
Even though this pattern seems to be consistent with the evidence from the MCA, it 
raises the question of why the results are less clear. This might be due to the how the 
states conceptualization the role of government. We speculate that the role of the state 
in Scandinavian countries might be captured by the term ‘service-oriented’ state. Indi-
                                                 
7  Detailed results of the PC factor analysis are given in Appendix Table 1. 
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cating the public co-ordination goes beyond the regulation of industrial relations. In the 
Anglo-American and French/German regimes the underlying state concept is virtually 
the same – a ‘regulatory-oriented’ state. Drawing on a state/market dichotomy, the An-
glo-American and French/German regimes, vary in the extent to which the state is al-
lowed to interfere with the market mechanism. Thus, the selection of co-ordination 
mechanisms and the extent of co-ordination vary between those two regimes in either 
choosing a market (Anglo-American) or non-market (French/German) co-ordination 
solution. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The results of our explorative analysis of public administration systems and their rela-
tionship with the market economy model can be summarized as follows: first, our 
analysis based on MCA and PC analysis for of 20 countries indicates the existence of 
three distinct public administration regimes within the OECD. In accordance with the 
families of nations heuristic (Castles 1993), the legal tradition and public employment 
regulation appear to be important factors of administrative regimes. The Anglo-
American public administration regime (Great Britain, New Zealand, Australia, Canada, 
United States of America) is characterized by a relative openness towards NPM instru-
ments. The French/German regime (Germany, Austria, France, Belgium) can be distin-
guished by its orientation towards legalistic task executions and relatively closed career 
systems for public employees. The latter also seems to apply to the Scandinavian public 
administration regime (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden). However, compared to 
the German/French regime, the Scandinavian regime appears to be more open towards 
NPM concepts and can, thus, be described as a mixed regime. This assessment of Scan-
dinavian countries is consistent with prior qualitative research perfomed by Christensen, 
Laegreid and Wise (2002: 167) and Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004: 239, 2004: 286). Both 
studies conclude that Scandinavian countries appear to be relatively open towards NPM, 
but also show that these countries are much more selective in the implementation of 
NPM instruments when compared to their Anglo-American counterparts. 
Second, we find tentative evidence in support of the institutional coherence argu-
ment. Purely market-inspired public management reforms appear to be more difficult to 
realize in highly co-ordinated market economies. This might suggest the existence of an 
institutional lock-in as implied by the VoC approach. Hence, functionalistic NPM ap-
proaches, assuming the convergence of public administration reform strategies, can thus 
far not be confirmed by our empirical analysis. Instead, findings tilt in the direction of a 
‘tandem-like’ fit between market economy models and the public administration re-
gimes for the Anglo-American and German/French administrative regimes. In this, our 
findings are consistent with the presumptions derived from the VoC approach. How-
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ever, our results also point out some limits of the VoC classification, as we found that it 
seems to not adequately capture the co-ordination mode in Scandinavian countries. 
Besides methodological limitations – small-N, use of proximity indicators, ambigu-
ous affiliation of indicators with Pollitt and Bouckaert’s (2004) dimensions of public 
management reform – there may be three substantive implications of this study. First, 
by classifying countries into public administration regimes we provide an empirically 
grounded, but still very preliminary, heuristic for comparative public administration 
research. Further research willshow how convincing and how useful this heuristic is in  
making sense of the alternative public sector modernization paths taken in different 
countries. Secondly, this study has been an exercise in transferring the VoC concept to 
the domain of public administration. There might be various public policies where the 
VoC’s focus on the interplay between co-ordination rules in different societal domains 
could provide insights in how to understand different patterns of public service privati-
zation (e.g., waste disposal, energy regulation, etc.). Finally, the search for institutional 
coherence between market and public administration regulation is static in nature. Re-
cently, there has been growing theoretical interest in exploring the VoC approach’s abil-
ity to account for processes of institutional change (Hall and Thelen 2007, Deeg and 
Jackson 2009). While further in-depth qualitative research might help to specify the role 
of institutional complementarities in these reforms, on the basis of our empirical evi-
dence we can only speculate that public management modernization is contingent on the 
existing market economy model when the public sector selects and implements NPM 
instruments. 
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Appendix Table 1: Principal-component factor analysis 
Variable Factor (1) loading Uniqueness 
Executives-parties dimension 0.022 0.458 
Federal-unitary dimension -0.431 0.504 
Scope of public employment 0.837 0.275 
Uncertainty avoidance  -0.709 0.458 
Academic advice 0.678 0.541 
Role of senior civil service 0.813 0.329 
Bureaucratic drift 0.487 0.387 
Eigenvalue Factor (1) 2.8  
Eigenvalue Factor (2) 1.3  
Note: Rotation = orthogonal varimax (Kaiser off) 
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